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Carbon offset markets have been suggested as a cost effective means of reducing GHG 
emissions. This paper develops a model of heterogeneous emitters and producers to 
examine the consequences of non-compliance on the performance of the carbon-offset 
market. The analysis begins with the derivation of demand and supply curves for carbon 
offsets based on perfect compliance. The paper then considers the impact of non-
compliance by producers on the supply of carbon offsets. Results show that the extent of 
producers’ non-compliance decreases with an increase in the audit probability and/or an 
increase in the penalty per unit of non-compliance. In addition, the number of producers 
participating in the carbon offsets market is shown to increase with an increase in the 
carbon-offset price. Based on the supply and demand curves, the analysis then considers 
the price and the quantity traded that are established by private firms that are engaged in 
carbon offset trading. The key role of the traders is to guarantee, based on the amount of 
monitoring that is undertaken, that the emitters purchase only carbon offsets that actually 
correspond to sequestered carbon. Both an oligopolistic and a monopolistic trading sector 
structure are considered. The analysis then examines two different organizational 
structures for the group that monitors producer compliance – a group owned by the firms 
and a government-run agency. The results of the analysis show that both monitoring 
groups always undertake sufficient monitoring to ensure that full compliance is achieved 
– thus, while non-compliance is possible, it does not occur in equilibrium. Since the level 
of monitoring effectively determines the amount of carbon that is sequestered and that 
can be traded, a monitoring group owned by the traders can achieve monopoly profits for 
the sector, even when it is oligopolistic. Although the formation of a government 
monitoring agency can potentially increase traded output and lower the price paid by 












The growing amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere is regarded as 
responsible for global warming. Many countries, especially the industrialized ones, have 
been considering policy actions to address their net GHG emission reductions. Persistent 
climate policy negotiations over more than a decade were finalized with the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP), the first international and legally binding agreement on climate protection, 
which came into force on February 16, 2005. The Protocol requires Annex B countries to 
reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride) by at least 5 percent 
below 1990 levels over the first commitment period 2008-2012. A key feature of the KP 
is its use of market based instruments to deal with climate change in a cost-efficient way.  
The Protocol allows for the use of three flexible implementation mechanisms: 
international emissions trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). 
The treatment of sinks was left open during Kyoto negotiations. The negotiating 
parties reached a compromise on this issue during the Conference of Parties in Bonn 
(July 2001) by allowing a substantial credit to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan 
and Russia for carbon dioxide sinks (Bohringer, 2004 && ). The subsequent COP7 in 
Marrakech (November 2001) approved carbon sinks to be used as a means of carbon 
reduction within the Annex B countries.  
A sink is defined as any process that removes CO2 from the atmosphere (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992). Forests and agricultural soil 
have the potential to assist in decreasing the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere by 
storing CO2 in soil or in the trees. Farmers can increase their soil sink potential by 
applying Best Management Practices (BMPs) that enhance carbon sequestration through 
improvements to soil, nutrient and livestock management practices (Fulton et. al., 2005), 
while forests managers can enhance carbon sequestration through afforestation, 
reforestation and forest management. Each unit of carbon stored in the soil or trees can be 




units can be verified and certified, they can be sold as carbon offsets or credits in a 
carbon-offset market.   
  Allowing trading of carbon offsets is one of the institutional innovations of 
Kyoto. Carbon-offset markets have been suggested as a cost effective means of reducing 
GHG emissions (Vercammen, 2002, Bloomfield et. al., 2003). An offset system can 
increase the efficiency of meeting emission targets by allowing entities with potential 
GHG reduction capabilities to supply offset credits to those that are required to reduce 
GHG emissions. This option offers greater flexibility in achieving emission reductions 
and hence the possibility of reaching environmental goals at a lower cost than would be 
possible if the countries did not have this alternative. The carbon offset system in Canada 
is still in the development stage. The decision whether Canada will elect to use sinks to 
meet a portion of its KP targets in the first commitment period is to be done by late 2006.  
  About half of Canada’s total GHG emissions by 2010 is anticipated to be released 
from LFEs (Government of Canada, 2005). Based on their historical emissions, level of 
production and an emission intensity factor, the government will allocate a large portion 
of initial permits to LFEs. Each permit gives LFEs the right to emit one unit of emission; 
LFEs will be allowed to trade these permits. High cost companies can meet their 
additional permit requirements by purchasing permits from emitters with lower 
abatement costs. Permits will be traded until the point where the marginal abatement 
costs of all traders will be equalized. It is this cost equalization aspect that makes permit 
trading more cost-efficient than regulatory approaches. Provided that sinks will be elected 
from the government as an option, LFEs can use offset credits as well to address their 
emission potential. In the general discussion we talked about trading among LFEs but we 
are going to abstract away from it for the rest of the paper in order to concentrate on the 
issue of carbon offsets.    
  Even though both forests and agricultural soil can serve as a sink, the focus of this 
work will be on soil carbon offsets created as result of adapting BMPs under a contract. 
Whether or not the market for carbon offsets will emerge depends on a number of factors 
which mainly are related to the profitability of the BMPs and the costs of a carbon 
contract. BMPs build up organic matter in the soil. Adoption of these practices brings a 




increasing productivity, improving moisture retention and decreasing irrigation needs, 
and decreasing soil degradation and erosion. Because of the economic benefits, farmers 
have incentives to adopt BMPs voluntarily. In addition, they may find an incentive to 
adopt these practices in order to participate in carbon-offset market. Whether or not 
farmers will produce carbon offsets by applying BMPs under a sequestration contract 
depends on the net benefits of such an undertaking.   
Provided that a market for carbon offsets emerges, the effectiveness of the market 
depends, in part, on the degree to which buyers and sellers in the market comply with the 
terms of the contracts they sign. Compliance, however, should not be presumed. Each 
tonne of emission reduced or offset created has a value that is equal to the price of a 
permit or a credit. This value can create an incentive for emitters to underreport their 
actual emissions and/or for sink generators to overreport the carbon offsets created from 
their emission reducing actions.  
Non-compliance will be an issue as long as monitoring is imperfect. The 
possibility of non-compliance arises because it is costly to determine the actions of 
emitters or producers. Because of this cost, producers as well as emitters are in a position 
to misreport. The monitoring and verification costs vary depending on the frequency of 
monitoring and verification, accuracy of measurement, the quantification techniques 
employed and the size of the contract.  
  A number of studies have examined non-compliance and enforcement in 
transferable permit systems. Malik (1990) examines the consequences of non-compliance 
for a transferable discharge permits (TDP) market and analyses under which conditions 
markets will retain their efficiency. Keeler (1991) extends Malik’s work by considering 
how a tradable permits’ system performs relative to uniform standards system under 
different penalty structures faced by the firms. Work from Hahn (1984) considers the 
effects of market power and non-compliance in permits markets. Egtern and Weber 
(1996) show that, when a firm has market power in the permit market, the initial 
allocation is fundamental in determining prices and levels of compliance for all 
participants in the permit market. While these studies have explored TDP market when 
emitters violate their emission levels, attention has not been paid to compliance issues 




paper is to examine overall cost effectiveness of the carbon-offset market when non-
compliance on both the demand side (i.e., the LFEs) and the supply side (e.g., 
agricultural/forestry producers) of the offset market is introduced. Since compliance can 
be increased if more enforcement is undertaken, the paper explores the optimal amount of 
resources that should be allocated to enforcement.  
In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to compliance by agricultural 
producers with the terms of the programs and policies in which they participate. 
Giannakas and Fulton (2000) introduce misrepresentation and cheating into the policy 
analysis of output quotas and subsidies. The paper analyses how the introduction of 
cheating and enforcement costs changes the welfare effects of the policy instruments. 
They show that a combination of policy instruments can result in a more efficient income 
transfer to producers than using policy instruments separately. 
Recent work by Giannakas and Kaplan (2005) introduces farmers’ non-
compliance in the economic analysis of the highly erodible lands policy. They examine 
the economic determinants of producer non-compliance and the determinants of the 
equilibrium enforcement policy.  
The analysis that will be performed in this paper is going to introduce non-
compliance in the economic analysis of carbon-offset market. Monitoring and 
verification has the potential to reduce or deter non-compliance. One prospective 
approach to address monitoring and verification of the carbon-offsets is the involvement 
of a trader in the market with the responsibility of undertaking carbon offsets trading. 
Traders will buy carbon offsets offered from producers and sell verified carbon offsets to 
emitters. Even though traders can have different structures – e.g., for profit firm, 
governmental agency, an association of LFEs or an association of carbon offset suppliers, 
this paper will focus on trading undertaken by for profit firms. In this case, expect a 
monopoly or oligopoly structure because of the fixed costs involved in running a carbon 
trading scheme.  
The analysis then examines two different organizational structures for the group 
that monitors producer compliance – a group owned by the firms and a government-run 
agency. The optimal amount of enforcement is likely to depend on the nature of the 




and their access to information. Thus, an important part of the analysis will be an 
examination of the impact of organizational form on compliance and hence on the cost 
effectiveness of a carbon-offset market. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second part develops a model of 
the emitter’s choice of whether to purchase a carbon offset or to consider the emission 
reduction itself. The third section builds up a model of the producer’s choice of whether 
to participate in the carbon-offset market or not. For each of these cases, the paper 
investigates the impact on the market of considering non-compliance. The paper also 
examines the role of policy instruments such as audit probabilities and penalties in 
promoting compliance. The fourth section of the paper investigates the pricing and output 
decisions of the traders involved in the market facilitate carbon offset trading. The 
analysis then examines the extent to which the different structures undertake monitoring, 
and the impact of this monitoring on the pricing behaviour. The last section summarizes 
the findings and concludes the paper. 
 
THE MODEL 
The model considers three sets of agents: LFEs, who generate a demand for carbon 
offsets as part of fulfilling their emission reduction requirements; producers, who supply 
carbon offsets; and third parties, who intermediate the trading of carbon offsets. Traders 
buy carbon offsets from producers and offer verified carbon offsets to emitters. Market 
price is determined by the interaction of genuine carbon offset supply and demand.  
  The model captures the heterogeneity of emitters and producers. We first examine 
the emitters’ decision and the farmers’ decision, followed by an examination of the 
traders’ pricing decision. We consider four possibilities for monitoring agencies that can 
undertake monitoring and derive the optimal monitoring level in each case. Based on 
these optimal monitoring levels, we will conclude with a relative efficiency ranking of 
the regarded monitoring agencies.  
 
THE EMITTERS’ PROBLEM 
Consider a group of emitters who produce an industrial product with carbon emissions as 




analyse the emitters’ decision in a perfect enforcement scenario. A key assumption of the 
analysis is that emitters differ in their cost of undertaking the emission reduction. This 
cost difference gives rise to a demand for carbon offsets. The analysis begins with the 
situation where perfect compliance is assumed; this assumption is then relaxed so that the 
more realistic situation where emitters have the potential to underreport their emissions 
can be explored. 
The model captures emission reduction required over and above permits. LFE has 
two choices to address her emission reduction requirements: undertaking abatement or 
buying carbon offsets. Emitters are assumed to differ in such things as technology 
adopted, management abilities and experience and these differences affect their relative 
emission reduction costs. Let  [ ] , e0 1 ∈  be the attribute that differentiates the LFEs. An 
emitter with attribute e has the following costs of emission reduction: 
0
A CC e β =+           if the emission requirement is met by abatement 
oe CP =             if the emission requirement is met by the purchase of a carbon offset 
where  A C  and  o C are the costs associated with abating one unit of emission and buying 
one unit of carbon offset, respectively. The parameter 
0 C  denotes the per unit abatement 
cost of the emitter with differentiating attribute e0 = . The parameter β  is a nonnegative 
cost enhancement factor that is constant across all emitters, while the term  e β  represents 
the additional cost incurred by emitters with  . e0 >  To ensure non-negativity of the 
portion of emitters that select the alternative of buying carbon offsets, it is assumed that 
0
e PC β ≥− (see equation 2). For tractability, the analysis assumes that emitters are 
uniformly distributed with respect to their differentiating attribute  . e   
An emitter’s choice of whether to undertake abatement or to buy carbon offset is 
determined by the relationship between the costs associated with each option. Figure 1 
illustrates the options available to emitters and the costs of these options. The horizontal 
axis depicts the differentiating attribute  . e  The upward sloping curve  A C  graphs the cost 
associated with undertaking abatement for different values of the differentiating attribute 
(i.e., for different emitters), while the horizontal line  o C  shows the cost of buying carbon 




attribute corresponding to the emitter indifferent between the two options. Specifically, 
the emitter with differentiating attribute  o e  given by:  








=⇒ =  
is indifferent between undertaking abatement or buying carbon offsets since the cost 
associated with the two options are the same. Emitters located to the left of  o e  (i.e., 
emitters with  [ ] , o e0 e ∈ ) find it less costly to undertake abatement, while emitters located 
to the right of  o e  (i.e., emitters with  ( ] , o ee 1 ∈ ) find it more profitable to buy carbon 
offsets.  
Recalling that emitters are uniformly distributed with respect to their 
differentiating characteristic  , e  the level of e corresponding to the indifferent emitter, 
, o e  also determines the fraction of emitters that decide to undertake abatement. The 
portion of emitters that choose to buy carbon offsets is given by  . o 1e −  By normalizing 
the mass of emitters at unity, the proportion of emitters that select to buy carbon offsets 
gives the demand for carbon offsets, 
d x , which is written as follows: 








The inverse demand curve can be written as  ( ) :.
0d
0e DP C x ββ =+ −  
Comparative statics results can be easily derived from the graph. A reduction in 
e P  shifts the 









). A decrease in the cost enhancement factor β  causes a rightward rotation of the 
A C  curve through the intercept at  ,













Implicit in the above analysis is the assumption that either (1) emitters do not 
cheat when reporting their emission; or (2) enforcement is perfect and costless. 
Enforcement, however, requires resources. The consequence of the resource costs of 
monitoring and enforcement might be a lack of enforcement activity, which in turn 
creates economic incentives for emitters to underreport their emission levels. Under these 
circumstances, each emitter can meet her emission reduction target by the choice of one 
of three options: undertaking abatement; reporting abatement that was not undertaken 
(i.e., cheating); and buying carbon offsets in the offset market.  
Assume that emitters know the probability  [ ] , 01 δ ∈  that they will be 
investigated, detected and punished, as well as the per-unit penalty ρ  for detected non-
compliance. In case an emitter violates the emission level, her expected cost will depend 
on her probability of being investigated, the penalty in case she is caught cheating and her 
personalized cost of engaging in cheating. This cost, which is denoted by  , e τ  can be the 
result of trying to masquerade emission violation. The parameter τ  is a non-negative cost 
enhancement factor which is constant across all emitters. Each emitter who cheats incurs 
e P




0  o e
 
Figure 1. Emitters’ decision under perfect compliance 
Emission 











this cost regardless of being detected or not. If an LFE is not detected she saves the 
abatement cost of reducing her emission by one unit or the cost of buying one unit of 
carbon offset. The expected cost of cheating for an emitter with attribute e who reports 
abatement that is not undertaken (i.e., underreports emissions) is given as follows: 
( 3 )   c Ce δρτ =+ 
Note that since emitters differ with respect to  , e  and as a result in their personalized cost 
of cheating, the expected costs of cheating differ across emitters. 
The emitter’s decision of whether to undertake abatement, buy carbon offsets or 
cheat is determined by comparing the costs associated with each of the three options. A 
graphical illustration of the emitter’s decision is given in Figure 2. The intersection of 
curves  A C  and  c C determines the level of the differentiating characteristic  : 1 e  











corresponding to the emitter who is indifferent between undertaking abatement and 
cheating. Similarly, the intersection of curves  o C  and  c C  determines the level of the 
differentiating characteristic  : 2 e   








corresponding to the emitter indifferent between buying carbon offset and cheating.  
Emitters positioned to the left of  1 e  (i.e., emitters with  [ ] , 1 e0 e ∈ ) choose to 
undertake abatement, while those positioned between  1 e  and  2 e  (i.e., emitters with 
() , 12 ee e ∈ ) underreport their emissions; emitters located to the right of  2 e  (i.e., emitters 
with  [ ] , 2 ee 1 ∈ ) select to buy carbon offsets. 
Assuming that emitters are uniformly distributed with respect to the 
differentiating attribute  , e  the level of  1 e  determines the fraction of emitters who abate, 
() 21 ee −  gives the fraction of emitters that engage in cheating, and ( ) 2 1e −  determines 





















Since the mass of emitters is normalized at unity, the fraction of emitters that 
decide to buy carbon offsets gives the emitters’ demand for carbon offsets,  ,
d
c2 x 1e =−  
which can formally be written as follows: 









=    
The inverse demand for carbon offsets can be written as  ( ) :.
d
1e c DP x τ δρ τ =+ −     
The level of abatement undertaken is presented by  , a1 x e =  which can be written as:  











and the amount of abatement violations is given by  , v2 1 x ee = −  where  v x  is given by: 
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Figure 2. Emitters’ decision under imperfect compliance 
Emission 
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The model analyses the emitter’s decision when all three choices are available. 
Assume we have an interior solution so that all three variables  ,,
d
avc x xx  are positive. 
This assumption needs the following conditions to hold: in order to have  , a x 0 >  














hold (see equation 8); and in order to have  ,
d
c x 0 >   ( ) e P τ δρ ≥− should hold (see 








=  for which the full compliance holds (i.e.,  v x 0 = ). For audit 
probabilities  ,
cr δ δ ≥  non-compliance will be completely deterred. Each emitter selects 
either to undertake abatement or to buy carbon offsets; she does not find underreporting 
profitable since the probability of being detected is too high.   
The inverse demand curves for a perfect compliance scenario as well as for the 
non-compliance case are illustrated in Figure 5 as curves  and  , 01 DD  respectively. 
Referring to Figure 2, we can derive the condition under which ( ) 21 ee 0 − =  (i.e. points 













Thus, both demand curves join for prices less than 
()
.









   
Comparative static results can be derived from Figure 2. For instance, an increase 
in the price of carbon offsets will influence the number of emitters that buy carbon offsets 
or engage in cheating behaviour. Specifically, the level of cheating will increase while, at 












An increase in the penalty per unit of violation causes an upward shift of the 
curve  c C  that decreases the violation level and increases the fraction of emitters that 








). Similarly, an increase in the audit 
probability  δ  shifts the curve  c C  upward, thus decreasing the violation level and 
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Figure 3. Demand curves under both scenarios 
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THE PRODUCERS’ PROBLEM 
The producers’ problem can be modeled similarly to the way emitters are modeled. Each 
producer cultivates product q under a certain land management practice, which can be 
either a BMP or a conventional land management practice. BMPs can be of many types 
such as: reducing tillage, planting permanent cover crops, undertaking agroforestry, 
reducing summerfallow, implementing good grazing management and fertilization 
practices (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, 2003). Each practice gives rise to different 
rates of carbon accumulation and to different streams of net profits. Due to the economic 
benefits related to the BMPs many farmers have already adapted these practices. 
However, a fraction of producers still produce under the conventional land management 
practices because of the new investment required, part of which is sunk, and a lack of 
experience to undertake change in their practices. In addition to these direct economic 
benefits, farmers may have an incentive to adopt BMPs in order to participate in the 
carbon-offset market. However, there are some important considerations for the farmer 
when he comes to signing the carbon offset contract.  
  Farmers adopt BMPs to a greater or a lesser degree. They may capture carbon in 
their soil, but none of this sequestered carbon is available for trading if they don’t sign a 
carbon-offset contract. Producers are reluctant to sign the contract for three reasons: the 
transaction costs, uncertainty, and the risk associated with signing the contract. Examples 
of transaction costs would be: administrative costs of keeping records and reporting 
carbon offsets, the costs of undertaking the transaction to sell the carbon offsets, and 
costs associated with the signing process. These transaction costs can reduce the 
attractiveness of participating in the carbon-offset market. In a study performed by 
Marbeck Resource Consultants (2004), the transaction costs for GHG offset system were 
estimated to range between $0.4 and $2 per tonne of CO2. 
  Other issue for producers considering participating in the carbon-offset market is 
the uncertainty issue. There is a lot of uncertainty surrounding climate change policies so 
the producers have to sign the contract under the condition of uncertainty - e.g., about the 
rate of soil carbon accumulation and about the market price of sequestered carbon. The 
carbon price can be affected by changes in demand and supply conditions which are not 




new emission reduction technology that becomes available to emitters. If emitters find it 
more profitable to invest in adopting this technology than to continue buying carbon 
offsets, the demand for carbon credits will decrease. Uncertainty, combined with the 
irreversibility of the decision, implies that delaying the signing decision has an option 
value. Producers will enter to a contract relation only if the net present value of their 
investment exceeds this option value (Vercammen, 2002).  
  Apart from this, producers incur additional risk if they decide to sequester carbon 
under a contract and to sell carbon credits in an emission market. Since producers are 
believed to be risk averse, they will require a risk premium in order to participate in a 
carbon sequestration scheme. The option value, the risk premium, as well as the 
transaction costs associated with signing the contract constitute the contract costs. Under 
the above considerations, each farmer will sign the contract only if the benefit from 
participating in the carbon-offset market exceeds the cost of signing the contract.     
  Producers have the choices of: (1) signing the carbon contract; or (2) not signing 
the contract. They are postulated to differ in the returns they get from their activities as a 
result of differences in such things as soil type, experience, location, education and 
management skills. Let α   denote the attribute that differentiates them. Producer 
heterogeneity is critical in generating the supply of carbon offsets.  
Before investigating the producers’ compliance decision, it is helpful to analyze 
their economic behaviour under a perfect enforcement scenario. The assumption is 
relaxed latter with the intention that the more realistic situation where producers have the 
potential to overreport their carbon offsets can be explored.  
 The per unit profit for a farmer with differentiating attribute  [ ] 0,1 α ∈  is given as 
follows: 
                          if he does not sign the sequestration contract 










where  e P  and 
q P  are the prices for carbon offset and product  , q  respectively. The 
parametersµ  and λ  are non-negative cost enhancement factors that are constant across 
all producers. It is assumed that  ; 0 λ µ >> the difference between λ  and µ  is denoted 




does not sign a contract, while term λα  symbolizes the cost incurred by producer with 
0 α >  who does sign a contract. The term λα  embodies the production cost that the 
product incurs as well as the carbon offset contract cost which includes the transaction 
costs associated with signing the contract, the risk premium that farmers require to take 
on the risk of signing the contract, and the option value that farmers attach to the 
potential to wait to sign the contract at a latter date (see Fulton et. al., 2005). Whether or 
not producer participates in carbon sequestration under a contract depends on the 
profitability of such involvement. Each producer makes his choice based on which 
alternative operates the highest per unit profit.  
The downward sloping curve 
nc π  drawn in Figure 1 represents the net returns 
associated with the production of product q for different values of α  (i.e., for different 
producers). The curve,  ,
c π  shows the net returns associated with production of product 
q and the sequestration of carbon under contract for different values of the 
differentiating attribute. The intersection of  and 
nc c π π determines the level of the 
differentiating characteristic corresponding to the farmer that is indifferent between 
signing the contract to sequester carbon and not signing the sequestration contract. This 
farmer has attribute 
c α given by:  
( 9 )   :.




To the left of  , c α  (i.e., for  ,
c 0 α α   ∈  ) all producers select to sign a contract, while to 
the right of  ,
c α  (i.e., for  ( ,
c 1 αα ∈  ) all producers choose not to sign the contract, no 
matter what land management practice they are applying. Given that α  is uniformly 
distributed between zero and one, 
c α  represents the portion of producers that produce 
carbon offsets under a contract, while  ( )
nc c 1 α α =−  is the fraction of producers that do 
not choose to sign the carbon offset contract.  By normalizing the mass of producers at 
unity, the fraction of producers that sign the contract gives the supply of carbon offsets in 
the market, which is written as follows: 








The inverse supply function is represented by equation:   :.
c
0e SP x ω =  
Comparative static results can be obtained form Figure 4. The price of carbon 
offsets is a key factor in determining how many producers sign the contract. An increase 
in the price of carbon offsets results in an increase of the benefits from signing the 
contract, ceteris paribus. More specifically, an increase in  e P  leads to an upward shift in 
the 
c π line. This upward shift results in a larger portion of producers signing the 









). As shown in Figure 4, decreasing the cost 
enhancement factor λ  causes a rightward rotation of the 
c π curve through the intercept at 
,
q








decrease in the cost enhancement factor µ  results in a rightward rotation of the 
nc π  
curve through the intercept at  ,














The previous analysis was performed under the assumption of perfect compliance. 
But in the real world, monitoring and enforcement activities required to ensure 
compliance with a contract are costly. Producers need to be monitored in order to ensure 
that the carbon offsets that are claimed actually represent a reduction of carbon. 
However, the resource costs of monitoring and enforcement might result in insufficient 
enforcement activity. The lack of enforcement creates economic incentives for producers 
to overreport the amount of carbon offsets they are supplying under a contract. Each 
producer now has a choice of: (1) signing a carbon offset contract; (2) signing the 
contract but not complying with its terms (i.e., cheating); and (3) not signing the contract.  
Suppose producers are audited with a probability  [ ] , 01 θ ∈  which is known to 
them and they face a per unit penalty γ  if they are caught cheating on the contract. If a 
producer cheats, his expected net return depends on the likelihood of his being audited, 
the penalty paid if he is caught cheating, as well as his individualized costs. If he does not 
get detected he can enjoy the benefit  ,
q
e PP σα +−  where σ  is a cost enhancement 
factor that is constant across all producers. The term σα  represents the costs incurred by 
c α  
λ  
µ
q P  
0 
q




c x  
c π  
nc π
Figure 4. Producers’ decision under perfect compliance.  
Differentiating 







producer with  0 α >  in the case when he signs the sequestration contract but does not 
comply with its terms. Thus this term comprises the production costs as well as the costs 
associated with cheating. Following Cule and Fulton, these costs might represent the cost 
of keeping contract records. It is assumed that  ; 0 λ σµ >>> the difference between λ  
and  σ  is denoted as  , ϕ λσ =−  while the difference between σ  and µ  is denoted as 
. η σµ =− If the producer is caught cheating, he gets the benefit  .
q
e PP γ σα +− −  As a 
result, the expected return from cheating for a producer with characteristic α  will be 
given as: 
ch q
e PP π θγ σα =+ − − 
Note that, since producers differ with respect to α , and as a result in their 
individualized costs σα , the expected profits from cheating differ across producers.  The 
producer’s decision of whether to participate in the carbon-offset market and, if so, 
whether to comply with the provisions of the sequestration contract depends on the 
profits received or expected to be received from these alternatives. A graphical 
illustration of the producer’s decision is given in Figure 5.  The intersection of curves 
c π  
and 
ch π  determines the level of the differentiating attribute  1 α  corresponding to the 
producer who signs the carbon offset contract but is indifferent between complying with 
the terms of the contract and cheating: 






=⇒ =  
In a similar way, the intersection of curves 
ch π  and 
nc π  determines the level of the 
differentiating attribute  2 α  corresponding to the producer who is indifferent between not 
participating in the carbon-offset market (i.e., not signing the contract) and signing the 
sequestration contract but not satisfying its terms:  







=⇒ =  
Producers located to the left of  1 α  (i.e., producers with differentiating attribute 
[ ] , 1 0 α α ∈ ) choose to participate in the carbon-offset market; producers located between 




but not to comply with all the provisions; and producers positioned to the right of  2 α  
(i.e., those with attribute  [ ] , 2 1 αα ∈ ) choose not to sign the sequestration contract no 
matter what land management practice they are applying.  
 
 
Since producers are uniformly distributed with respect to differentiating 
characteristic , α   2 α  determines the portion of producers that sign the sequestration 
contract;  1 α  gives the portion of producers who sign the carbon contract and do honour 
the provisions; ( ) 21 α α −  gives the portion of producers that sign the contract but do not 
comply with its terms; and ( ) 2 1 α −  determines the portion of producers that do not sign 








c α  
λ  
µ
q P  
0 
q




c π  
nc π
Figure 5. Producers’ decision under non-compliance 
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The portion of producers who sign the contract, but do not comply with the 
provisions, ( ), 21 α α −  will equal zero when all three curves  ,  and 
cc h n c π ππ  meet at the 
same point. This happens when carbon offset price  . e P
ωθγ
ϕ
=   
By normalizing the mass of producers at unity, the portion of producers that 
choose to sign the contract gives the total supply of carbon offsets in the market, 
,
s
c2 x α =  which can be written as follows:    









Having introduced cheating in the model, the inverse supply equation of the total carbon 
offsets offered from producers is the following:  
( 14 )   :.
s
2e c SP x θγη =+  
When cheating is not considered, aggregate producers’ welfare is given by the area 
, 0VKQ1  while, when cheating is introduced into the analysis, the aggregate producers’ 
welfare is increased by the area  . HAG   
The carbon offsets offered in the market can come from producers who actually 
undertake sequestration or from those who engage in cheating activity. Put in a simple 
way, carbon offsets supplied in the market can be genuine or bogus. Only producers 
positioned to the left of  1 α  contribute with real carbon offsets. As a result, the supply of 
real carbon offsets in the market  ,
s
r1 x α =  is given as follows: 






while the amount of bogus carbon offsets in the market,  ,
ss
cr 21 xxα α −=−  is given by: 









The number of producers that choose not to sign the sequestration contract,  ,
s s
nc c x 1x =−  
is presented by: 












The previous analysis shows that the number of total contracts signed, the amount 
of real carbon offsets and the amount of bogus carbon offsets offered in the market 
depends on the audit probability as well as the penalty applied per unit of non-
compliance. In addition to these factors, the total number of contracts signed is 
influenced by the price of carbon offsets and  ; η  the amount of genuine carbon offsets is 
impacted by  ; ϕ  and the amount of bogus carbon offsets is influenced by the price of 
carbon offsets as well as by the three parameters  ,   and  . ϕ ωη   
This model analyses the producer’s decision when all three choices are available. 
The relation 
qq
ee PPPP θγ +> +− guarantees that a positive number of producers, 
,
s
r x 0 >  select to sign the carbon offset contract and to comply with its terms. Assume we 
have an interior solution so that all three variables  ,  , and ( )
s ss s
rn c c r x xx x −  are positive. 
This assumption needs the following conditions to hold: in order to have  ,
s
nc x 0 >  
e P η θγ >− should hold (see equation 17); and in order to have () ,
ss
cr x x0 − >   e Pϕ θγω >  





=  for which the full compliance holds (i.e., ()
ss
cr x x0 − = ). For audit 
probabilities ,
cr θ θ ≥  non-compliance (i.e., overreporting) will be completely deterred. 
Each producer chooses either to sign the carbon offset contract and honour it or to decline 
the sequestration contract. He does not find overreporting profitable since the probability 
of being detected is too high.   
Figure 6 illustrates three supply curves  ,  and  , 01 2 SS S where:  0 S  represents the 
inverse supply curve under a full-compliance scenario;  1 S  represents the supply of 
genuine carbon offsets; and  2 S  represents the total supply of carbon offsets after we have 
introduced cheating in the model. For prices  e P
ωθγ
ϕ




   
Comparative statics results can be derived diagrammatically from Figure 5. An 
increase in the penalty per unit of non-compliance causes a downward shift in the 
c π  
curve, which in turn results in a decrease in the number of contracts signed as well as in 
the non-compliance level (i.e.,  ( )
,






), ceteris paribus. In a similar way, 
a higher audit probability causes an increase in the expected penalty and shifts the 
c π  
curve downwards, thus decreasing the amount of bogus carbon offsets as well as the total 
amount of carbon offsets offered in the market from producers (i.e., 
()
,






), ceteris paribus.  
An increase in the carbon offset price  e P  causes an upward parallel shift of the 
curves 
s π   and 
c π by the same amount. These shifts result in a higher number of the 










); the amount of carbon sequestered under contract remains 






















By examining the supply curves in Figure 6 we draw some implications. An 
increase in price of carbon offsets from zero to 
ωθγ
ϕ
 increases the number of producers 
who sign contracts with full compliance, since nobody who signs a sequestration contract 
finds it profitable to cheat along section 0T  of the supply curve.  
  An increase in the penalty per unit or in the auditing probability causes an upward 
shift in the  2 S  curve as well as a rightward parallel shift in the  1 S  curve, thus extending 
the section 0T  where the three supply curves converge. As a result, the amount of 
genuine carbon offsets supplied in the market increases.  
 
TRADERS’ INVOLVEMENT IN THE MARKET  
Carbon offsets trading will be undertaken by traders that buy carbon offsets from 
producers and sell verified carbon offsets to emitters. This section of the paper considers 
two structures for the trading sector: monopolistic structure and oligopolistic structure. If 
trading is undertaken by profit maximizing firms, we expect a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic structure to emerge because of the fixed costs involved in running a trading 
scheme. For each of these cases, we consider that monitoring can be undertaken by a 
monitoring group which can be either a governmental agency or a monitoring group 
operating in behalf of the traders. Even though other structures can be used for the trading 
sector or the monitoring group, we concentrate the work of this paper only on the above-
mentioned structures.    
  The amount of monitoring performed by the monitoring agency defines the total 
supply of carbon offsets as well as the supply of genuine carbon offsets in the market. 
This section examines the trader’s price and output decision as well as the monitoring 
agency’s decision of the choice of  ; θ  the consideration of the last element means the 
audit probability is endogenized. The optimal amount of enforcement is likely to depend 
on the nature of the organization that undertakes the enforcement since they might have 
different objective functions. The section examines the extent to which these different 
monitoring agencies undertake monitoring, and the impact of this monitoring on the 




The supply and the demand equations for the carbon offset market are determined 
from the producers’ and the emitters’ problem, respectively. Emitters are aware that 
producers will be monitored and that carbon offsets traded by third parties will represent 
actual sequestration, hence the carbon offsets demand emerging from emitters will be 
represented by  1 D  (see Figure 3). Given this demand and the supply, the amount of 
carbon offsets trading and the endogenous auditing probability are determined in a two 
stage game. In the first stage of the game, the monitoring agency chooses the level of 
auditing that it will undertake, knowing the producers’ response to this choice of auditing 
as well as the impact of the chosen θ  on the pricing decisions. In the second stage of the 
game, traders make their decision on how much carbon offsets to buy from producers and 
how much to sell to emitters based on the degree of auditing that has been undertaken. 
The game is solved using backward induction (Kreps, 1990).   
 
The monopoly and oligopoly cases 
First we consider the case when the trader is a profit maximizing monopolist-
monopsonist. The firm is thus the sole buyer of carbon from producers and the exclusive 
provider of verified carbon offsets to emitters. The profit maximization problem for the 
trader would be: 
      
()
                    





where  e P  is the price at which the trader buys the amount ( ) YX +  of carbon offsets, P  is 
the price at which he is selling the Y  verified units, while Y  is defined from the auditing 
probability θ  determined by the monitoring group (i.e., Y
θγ
φ
= ). The solution to this 
problem is presented in Appendix A. The analysis shows that the output is the lesser of 
Y
∗ and  , Y  where Y
∗ is determined where  , MRM O =  and marginal revenue and 
marginal outlay are derived from the demand curve  1 D  and the supply curve  , 0 S  
respectively. The familiar “marginal revenue equal to marginal outlay” solution for the 
trader’s problem will serve as a starting point in analysing the monitoring group problem.  




With knowledge of the behaviour of the trading firm, the decision of the 
monitoring group can be considered. Since the monitoring group operates on behalf of 
the firm, it chooses the audit probability θ  that maximizes the profit of the firm minus 
the monitoring cost. The auditing probability defines the position of the genuine carbon 
offsets supply curve  . 1 S  Since the trading firm will never trade more than  , Y
∗  the 
monitoring group will always find it optimal to make Y  no larger than Y
∗, thus the 
constraint is binding. The reason is because of the extra cost of monitoring that could be 
saved by cutting back in monitoring. In order to cover the monitoring costs  m C , the 
monitoring group will reduce Y  to  , 1 Y  where  1 Y  is below Y
∗ and is determined by 
'
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ξθ =  is assumed to be an increasing and convex function 
of the auditing intensity  , θ  and ξ  is a positive scalar that depends on factors such as the 
total number of producers and the effort required to perform monitoring. 
The first order condition equalizes the marginal revenue with the sum of the 
marginal outlay and the marginal cost of monitoring 
' . m MRM OC =+  The optimal 
amount of monitoring, which is defined by the auditing probability, is given by the 
formula:  











while the amount of carbon offsets that will be traded by the firm is given by: 












Now consider the case when oligopolistic-oligopsonistic firms undertake the 
carbon offsets trading. Representatives from these firms form the monitoring group. As 
with monopoly, the output will be the lesser of Y
∗ and  . Y  Traders will never trade more 
than , Y
∗  therefore the monitoring group will always find it optimal to make Y  no larger 
than  Y
∗ in order to save the extra costs of monitoring. As a result, the constraint is 
binding. In order to cover the monitoring costs, the monitoring group will reduce Y  to 
, 1 Y  which is the same as defined earlier.   
From the monitoring group perspective, the group behaves on behalf of all 
oligopolistic firms, thus chooses the audit probability θ  that maximizes the profit of all 
traders minus the monitoring cost. Since the objective function is the same with the one 
corresponding to the monopoly case, the optimal amount of monitoring will be given by 
the same formulas (19). Monitoring probability define the supply of the genuine carbon 
offsets, which in this case is the same with the one in the monopoly case. Knowing that 




amount of carbon offsets that oligopolistic firms trade will be  , Y  which is the same with 
the amount that a monopolistic firm would trade (see formula 20). Both monopoly and 
oligopoly scenarios lead to the same solution because of the vertical supply. The 
oligopoly solution is presented in Appendix B. The amount of carbon offsets traded by 













The governmental monitoring group case 
This part examines the case of carbon offsets’ trading performed by per-profit firms with 
monitoring services undertaken by the government. The analysis considers first the 
monopolistic structure for the trader followed after by the case of an oligopolistic 
structure.   
 
Monopoly trader/ governmental agency monitoring group 
The profit-maximization problem of the monopolist determines  :. m YM RM O
∗ =  The 











 On the other side, the 
governmental agency chooses the audit probability θ   such that to maximize the total 
welfare, which is the sum of the producers surplus, consumer surplus, and trader’s profit 
minus the monitoring costs. The total level of the genuine carbon offsets,  , uc Y
∗  is obtained 











This level of output, which is determined by  , 0m 1 SC D + =  is presented in Figure 8 as 
well. Since the monopoly firm will never trade more than  , m Y
∗  the governmental agency 
will find it optimal to make 
g Y  equal to  . m Y
∗  Governmental agency cuts back in 
monitoring in order to save the extra costs of monitoring. As a result, the supply of 




previous analysis that the monitoring agency that was operating on behalf of the 
monopoly undertakes as much monitoring as to position the supply of genuine carbon 
offsets at  .
m Y  Even though government agency is constrained in its choice from the 
monopolist’s selection of the trading level, the amount of genuine carbon offset 
g Y  
supplied in this case is higher than  .
m Y  The price that emitters are paying for verified 
carbon offsets decreases to  .
g P  Hence; the structure of a governmental monitoring 















Figure 8. Governmental agency monitoring (Case of a monopoly trader) 
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Oligopoly traders/ governmental agency monitoring group 
The total amount of carbon offsets that oligopolistic traders find optimal to trade is 
determined by equating marginal revenue of the industry with the marginal outlay of the 
industry (i.e., 
o0 MRM O = ). Given the supply and demand parameters of our case, this 
total amount  o Y

























Since the oligopolistic firms will never trade more than  , o Y
∗  the monitoring agency will 
find it optimal to make 
g Y  equal to  , o Y
∗  otherwise it will waste resources with extra 
monitoring. The supply of genuine carbon offsets,  , 1 S  will be located as illustrated in 
Figure 9.  
From the previous analysis, the monitoring agency that was operating on behalf of 
the oligopoly was choosing as optimal the level of monitoring that positions the supply of 
genuine carbon offsets at  .
om YY =  On the other side, government agency, being 
constrained from the maximum level of trading that oligopolistic firms can undertake, 
selects the optimal audit probability such that 
g Y  amount of genuine carbon offsets to be 
supplied in the market. The price emitters are paying in this case decreases further more 
to 
'.
g P   The structure of a governmental monitoring agency can potentially increase the 
carbon offsets amount traded as well as lowers the price emitters are paying for the 






While there is enough monitoring in each case to deter cheating, the optimal level 
of auditing probability is different for different structures of the monitoring group. A 
governmental agency will undertake more monitoring than a monitoring group owned by 
the firms. The more monitoring is undertaken from the monitoring group, the greater is 
the amount of the genuine carbon offsets in the market; hence the greater is the quantity 
traded from the traders in the carbon-offset market.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper develops a model of heterogeneous emitters and producers to examine the 
performance of the market when the assumption of non-compliance is relaxed for both 
actors of the carbon market. Besides this, the paper examines what impact has the 
involvement of the traders in carbon-offset market on non-compliance, as well as how the 
structure of the monitoring group affects non-compliance and the amount of carbon 






Figure 9. Governmental agency monitoring (Case of oligopoly traders) 
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  The analysis suggests that the extent of producers’ participation in the carbon 
market and the share of producers in non-compliance depend on the price of carbon 
offsets and the enforcement policy of the government. More specifically: the extent of 
non-compliance is shown to decrease with an increase in the audit probability and /or an 
increase in the penalty per unit of non-compliance; the number of producers participating 
in the carbon offsets market is shown to increase with an increase in the carbon-offset 
price.  
  Similarly with the producers’ side, the comparative statics results show that the 
extend of emitters non-compliance increases with an increase in the price of carbon 
offsets and decreases with an increase in the audit frequency and/or an increase in the 
penalty per unit of cheating.  
  Based on the supply and demand curves, the analysis then considers the price and 
the quantity traded that are established by private firms that are engaged in carbon offset 
trading. The key role of the traders is to guarantee, based on the amount of monitoring 
that is undertaken, that the emitters purchase only carbon offsets that actually correspond 
to sequestered carbon. Both an oligopolistic and a monopolistic trading sector structure 
are considered.  
  The analysis then examines two different organizational structures for the group 
that monitors producer compliance – a group owned by the firms and a government-run 
agency. The results of the analysis show that both monitoring groups always undertake 
sufficient monitoring to ensure that full compliance is achieved – thus, while non-
compliance is possible, it does not occur in equilibrium. Since the level of monitoring 
effectively determines the amount of carbon that is sequestered and that can be traded, a 
monitoring group owned by the traders can achieve monopoly profits for the sector, even 
when it is oligopolistic. Although the formation of a government monitoring agency can 
potentially increase traded output and lower the price paid by emitters, these changes are 
likely to be small, particularly when the trading sector is monopolistic. As we were 
expecting, the optimal amount of enforcement, and as a result the cost effectiveness of a 
carbon-offset market, depends on the nature of the organization that undertakes the 
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Stage 2:  The maximization problem for the trader: 
 
The objective function:                         
()
                   






Lagrangean function:                          () () e LP YP YX YY κ = −+ + −  
 
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to the choice variables  , YX  and the 
Lagrangean multiplier κ for this problem are: 
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The second inequality holds as a strict inequality, hence  . X 0 =  




=  while  () ( ) . 2
θγ
κτ δ ρ ω τ
ϕ
=+ − +  
Solving maximization problem of the monitoring group will provide us the optimal 
auditing probability  . θ
∗  We are going to substitute the optimal monitoring probability 
into the formula that we just derived for Y  in order to find the amount of carbon offsets 
Y
∗ that will be traded in the market. 
For the sake of completeness we report the optimal lagrangean multiplier κ





Stage 1:   Maximization problem for the monitoring group that operates on trader’s behalf 
 











where P  is given by:  () () : 1 DP Y
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After substituting this to the formulas we derived for Y  and  , κ  we get the optimal 
amount of carbon offsets that will be traded in the market as well as the optimal value for 
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The Lagrangean function can be written as: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) i i ie ii i i ii i i i LP yyyP yxy x yx Yyy κ −− − − =+ −+ + + + +− −  
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to the choice variables  , ii yx  and the 
Lagrangean multiplier  i κ for this problem are: 
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All terms in condition (B2) are negative therefore it turns out to be a strict inequality 
implying as a result  . i x 0 =  This finding suggests that, when buying carbon offsets, 
traders find it profitable to operate only in the component 0T  of the producers’ supply.  
 








, i 0 κ >  , i x 0 =  and  . i y0 >  As derived from equation (B1), the reaction function for the 
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and by substituting this back to the equation for  , i y  we get the level of the amount of 
carbon offsets purchased from producers and sold to emitters from the trader identified 






Stage 1: Maximization problem for the monitoring group tha operates on traders’ behalf: 
 













































Governmental Agency  
 
Stage 1: Unconstrained maximization problem for the monitoring group: 
 
 Monitoring group maximizes the social welfare minus the monitoring cost. The objective 
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By substituting the optimal θ
∗ in the formula for  , Y  we find the amount of carbon 
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